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Midwest Piping Doctrine: Does it
Support Employee Free Choice and
Industrial Stability?
I. Introduction
In reaction to the significant amount of labor unrest in America'
Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act' in 1935. The
purpose of the Act was to promote industrial peace by fostering an
atmosphere of cooperation in labor-management relations.3 To
achieve this goal of industrial peace Congress sought to eliminate
questions concerning the right of employees to self-organization and
collective bargaining from the arena of labor disputes.4 In order to
protect this employee right the National Labor Relations Board,5 in
Midwest Piping & Supply Co.,6 required an employer to adhere to a
policy of strict neutrality when confronted with conflicting union
representation claims. Specifically, the Midwest Pping doctrine pro-
hibits an employer from either recognizing one of the unions or en-
tering into a collective bargaining agreement with one of them,
before a Board conducted election has determined which union is
entitled to be the exclusive bargaining representative7 of the employ-
ees.
8
Both the Board and the courts require an employer to await the
results of a Board-conducted election when there is a "question con-
1. See generally F. DULLES, LABOR IN AMERICA (3d ed. 1966); A. Cox & D. BOK, LA-
BOR LAW (5th ed. 1962).
2. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168
(1976) [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
3. For a discussion of congressional policy, see S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1935); H.R. REP. Nos. 969, 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1935).
4. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
5. Hereinafter referred to as the Board.
6. Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976) provides in part,
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other con-
ditions of employment. ...
8. Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945); 10 NLRB ANN. REP. 39
(1945).
cerning representation."9 Controversy exists, however, over what
standard to use when determining whether a representation question
exists. The courts perceive a representation question in the rival
union situation only when no union makes a clear showing of major-
ity support. '0 Consistent with this reasoning, the courts will accept
indicators of majority support other than an election. The Board,
however, finds a question concerning representation whenever a ri-
val union's claim is not clearly unsupportable or specious. " Since
an election is the only reliable indicator of employee choice the
Board recognizes, the Board requires its use in practically all situa-
tions involving a rival union. Until this disagreement between the
Board and the courts over the proper standard is resolved, the con-
flict between labor and management that the Act was intended to
prevent can only increase.' 2 This note examines the viability of the
NLRB's approach and the need for reappraisal of its position.
A. Midwest Piping & Supply Co.
In Midwest Pping & Supply Co. '" the United Steelworkers of
America'4 and the International Association of Steam and Gas Fit-
ters,' 5 both claiming to represent a majority of the employees of the
Midwest Piping & Supply Co., filed representation petitions' 6 with
9. NLRB v. Hudson Berlind Corp., 203 N.L.R.B. 421 (1973), enforced, 494 F.2d 1200
(2d Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Western Commercial Transport, Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 117 (1973), en-
forced 487 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1973); Iowa Beef Packers v. NLRB, 144 N.L.R.B. 615 (1963),
enforcement granted in part and denied in part, 331 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1964).
A "question concerning representation" is a term of art derived from Section 9(c) of the
Act. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1976).
10. American Can Co. v. NLRB, 218 N.L.R.B. 102 (1975), enforced, 535 F.2d 180 (2d
Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Hudson Berlind Corp., 203 N.L.R.B. 421 (1973), enforced, 494 F.2d 1200
(1974); American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 170 N.L.R.B. 85 (1968), enforcement denied, 411 F.2d
147 (6th cir. 1969).
i. Buck Knives, Inc. v. NLRB, 223 N.L.R.B. 983 (1976), enforcement denied, 549 F.2d
1319 (9th Cir. 1977); Playskool, Inc. v. NLRB, 195 N.L.R.B. 560 (1972), enforcement denied,
477 F.2d 66 (7th Cir. 1973); American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 170 N.L.R.B. 85 (1968), enforce-
ment denied, 411 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1969); Boys Market, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 105 (1965).
12. An order of the Board to cease recognizing a union until Board certification of that
union is not self-executing. The Board must petition the appropriate federal court of appeals
for enforcement of the order under section 10(e) of the Act if the employer refuses to comply
with the order. Section 10(e) provides in part:
The Board shall have the power to petition any court of appeals of the United States,
or if all the courts of appeals to which application may be made are in vacation, any
district court of the United States, within any circuit or district, respectively, wherein
the unfair labor practice in question occurred or wherein such person resides or
transacts business, for the enforcement of such order and for appropriate temporary
relief or restraining order. ...
29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976).
13. 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945).
14. United Steelworkers of America, CIO [hereinafter referred to as the Steelworkers].
15. International Association of Steam & Gas Fitters of the United States and Canada,
Local 562 and Auxiliary Local 562, United Association of Steam, Gas, Refrigeration and Serv-
ice Fitters & Pipe Fabricators, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor [hereinafter
referred to as the Steamfitters].
16. When a representation petition is filed, the Board will investigate the petition to de-
termine if there is reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation exists. If the
the Board. The Steamfitters presented authorization cards'7 signed
by a majority of the employees as evidence of support and de-
manded recognition by the employer as the exclusive bargaining
agent of the employees, to which demand the employer acceded.
The Board held that the employer violated Section 8(a)( 1)18 of
the Act by executing a closed shop agreement 9 with the Steamfitters
while conflicting representation petitions were pending before the
Board.2" The Board noted that Congress had granted it exclusive
authority to investigate and determine the identity of the collective
bargaining representative. El Since authorization cards were not con-
sidered a reliable indicator of employee preference when rival un-
ions existed 2 the Board required the employer to remain neutral
until the question was settled under the administrative procedures
provided by Congress. In Midwest Piping the employer usurped this
function of the Board by his premature recognition of a bargaining
representative. Moreover, the Board contended that this recognition
granted unwarranted prestige and advantage to the favored union
and thereby interfered with the employees' exercise of their freedom
to choose an exclusive bargaining representative.23
The goal of permitting employees the freedom to choose their
own representative demands protection of the selection process from
Board finds reasonable cause to believe there is need for an election, the Board will hold a
hearing. The Board will direct an election if it decides upon the record of the hearing that a
representation question exists. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1976).
17. An authorization card is usually dated and contains a statement that the undersigned
employee supports the union as the exclusive bargaining representative.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). Section 8(a)(l) reads:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 157 of this title. Section 7 reads:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
19. A closed shop agreement provides that only union members may be hired by the
employer.
20. Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945). Although the employer may
lack actual knowledge of the petition, the Board will find a Midwest Piping violation if he
should have known of the rival union's claim.
21. Compare with Iowa Beef Packers v. NLRB, 144 N.L.R.B. 615 (1963), enforcement
granted inpart and denied in part, 331 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1964) [and] Novak Logging Co., 119
N.L.R.B. 1573 (1958).
22. [Ilt is well known that membership cards obtained during the heat of rival or-
ganizing campaigns like those of the respondent's plants, do not necessarily reflect
the ultimate choice of a bargaining representative; indeed, the extent of dual mem-
bership among the employees during periods of intense organizing activity is an im-
portant unknown factor affecting a determination of majority status, which can best
be resolved by a secret ballot among the employees.
Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1070 n.13 (1945).
23. The Board ruled that "[b]y interferring with, restraining, and coercing its employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the [company] has engaged in
and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(l) of the Act." Mid-
west Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1076 (1945).
any coercive influence exerted by the employer. Many commenta-
tors, question, however, whether premature recognition actually has
a coercive effect on the employees' freedom of choice.24 If recogni-
tion of one of the rival unions is not coercive, then the delay in se-
lecting a bargaining representative caused by the Board's insistence
on an election is unjustified.2 5 Whether the Midwest Piping doctrine
advances congressional labor policy depends on the balance it strikes
between these potentially conflicting requirements.
Resolution of this problem requires that two questions be an-
swered. First, when two or more unions compete for the support of
the employees in a company, does the employer by recognizing one
of the unions, or by entering into a contract with one of the unions,
exert a coercive effect on the employees' freedom of choice in select-
ing a representative? Second, does the protection of employee free-
dom of choice provided by the doctrine outweigh the disruptive
effect that delay in the selection of a bargaining agent has on labor
relations?
B. The Basisfor Requiring Employer Neutrality
1. Unwarranted Prestige. -The Midwest Piping doctrine rests
upon the theory that premature recognition by the employer en-
hances the status of the recognized union in the eyes of the employ-
ees.6 This favored status then influences the employees to vote for
that union. When none of the competing unions has a contract
with the employer this theory has some validity. The employees
must choose between two unknowns, and any opportunity for one
union to demonstrate greater access to the employer would greatly
influence the employees. 8 Nevertheless, employer recognition of a
union does not necessarily guarantee that union the employees'
24. Getman, The Midwest Piping Doctrine.- An Example of the Needfor Reappraisal of
Labor Board Dogma, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 292 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Needfor Reap-
praisal]. See generally Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections
under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38 (1964); Getman, Goldberg &
Herman, NLRB Regulation of Campaign Tactics.- The Behavioral Assumptions on Which the
Board Regulates, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (1975) [hereinafter cited as BehavioralAssumptions];
Roomkin & Abrams, Using Behavioral Evidence in NLRB Regulation. A Proposal, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 1441 (1977).
25. Needfor Reappraisal, supra note 24; Behavioral Assumptions, supra note 24.
26. 10 NLRB ANN. REP. 39 (1945).
27. NLRB v. Peter Paul, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 281 (1970), enforcement denied, 467 F.2d 700
(9th Cir. 1972); American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 170 N.L.R.B. 85 (1968), enforcement denied,
411 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1969); Sunbeam Corp., 99 N.L.R.B. 546 (1952); Midwest Piping &
Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945); 10 NLRB ANN. REP. 39 (1945).
The Board has stated, however, that it does not attempt to determine the actual effect of
employer conduct on the employees' exercise of their free choice. The Board instead concerns
itself with whether it is reasonable to conclude that the conduct tended to prevent the free
formation and expression of employee choice. See 33 NLRB ANN. REP. 60 (1968).
28. 10 NLRB ANN. REP. 39(1945). See also Lenscraft Optical Corp. & Rayex Corp., 128
N.L.R.B. 836 (1960).
votes. 29 Although the employees could interpret this favored status
as indicating that the recognized union deals more effectively than its
competitor with the employer, they could also perceive it as evidenc-
ing that the employer can control the recognized union more easily
than he could the rival."a Furthermore, if the employees on their
own fail to discern the possible ulterior motives behind the em-
ployer's actions, the rival union has ample opportunity to point out
the possible existence of such motives to the employees."a
When one of the rivals is an incumbent union there is even less
reason for concern about the prestige accorded the union recognized
by the employer.3 2 The incumbent union's prior dealings with the
employer are the most important factor in the employees' perception
of that union as a responsible advocate of their rights.3 3 Further-
more, if a representation question is pending and the contract ex-
pires, the Board allows an employer to extend the terms of the
contract if no substantial terms3 4 are changed. 5 It is difficult to per-
ceive the incumbent union's prestige being further enhanced by rec-
ognition in that situation.
Finally, in either the incumbent or nonincumbent union situa-
tion, the employer is free to express his opinion regarding which
union he favors, provided no threats of reprisal or promises of bene-
fits are made.36 Thus, a union gains little advantage from employer
recognition that could not be attained by an announcement of the
employer's preference. 37 Therefore, employer recognition of the in-
cumbent does not add significantly to the union's prestige. Neither
does employer recognition of the nonincumbent union damage an
incumbent union's ability to win employee support if it has a suc-
cessful record.
The Board's view that employer recognition attaches unwar-
ranted prestige and impinges on employee freedom of choice is
greatly overstated. The validity of the Midwest Piping doctrine de-
pends, therefore, on the weight given to the alleged advantage that
attaches with employer recognition of a union.
29. See Behavior Assumptions, supra note 24, at 1474-76.
30. Id at 1475.
31. For a discussion and criticism of the Board's assumption that employees do not have
the sophistication to see the possible ulterior motives in an employer's attempts to grant favors
to a favored union, see id
32. For an article discussing the differing effect of recognition in the incumbent union
situation and the nonincumbent union situation, see Note, The Employer's Duty ofNeutraliy in
the Rival Union Situation, Ill U. OF PA. L. REV. 930 (1963).
33. See Needfor Reappraisal, supra note 24.
34. The substantial terms of a contract are those that establish the rates of pay and the
conditions and hours of work.
35. G & H Towing, 168 N.L.R.B. 589 (1967); see also Midtown Service Co., 171
N.L.R.B. 1306 (1968).
36. Rold Gold of Cal., Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 285 (1959).
37. See id; Cupples-Hesse Corp., 119 N.L.R.B. 1288 (1958).
2. Unwarranted Advantage. -While the unwarranted prestige
factor lacks sufficient impact to be deemed coercive, the possible ad-
vantage accruing to a union from employer recognition can be high-
ly influential on employees. 38 The recognized union can provide the
employees with concrete benefits by negotiating a contract or suc-
cessfully processing grievances. In contrast, the rival union can only
offer the hope of future gains it will attempt to achieve. It is easy to
perceive the coercive effect inherent in this situation,39 since the em-
ployee, if he supports the nonrecognized union, will have to relin-
quish guaranteed benefits in exchange for those that are merely
speculative in nature.' The unwarranted advantage that attaches to
a union that secures a collective bargaining agreement in a rival
union situation could be a serious impediment to the free expression
of employee choice. When an employer's recognition of a union has
a coercive effect the application of the doctrine would obviously be
justified. Thus, the problem is determining in which situations a rep-
resentation question exists such that an employer's recognition of
one of the unions would have a coercive effect. Although the Board
and the courts agree that a standard must be established to deter-
mine when a representation question exists, they disagree on the
standard.
II. The Standards for Determining Whether a Question of
Representation Exists
A. The NLRB Standard
The Board perceives a question concerning representation as ex-
isting whenever a representation petition is pending before the
board,4 t one of the unions is an incumbent union,4 2 there are objec-
38. See Lenscraft Optical Corp. & Rayex Corp., 128 N.L.R.B. 836 (1960) (agreement
with the incumbent union to give employees a retroactive wage increase if incumbent union
won the election).
39. See NLRB v. Hudson Berlind Corp., 203 N.L.R.B. 421 (1973), enforced 494 F.2d
1200 (2d Cir. 1974); Shea Chem. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1027 (1958); NLRB v. National
Container Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 1544 (1953), enforced, 211 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1954); Sunbeam
Corp., 99 N.L.R.B. 546 (1952).
40. "[T]he making of a contract with a union is the most potent kind of support imagina-
ble." Sunbeam Corp., 99 N.L.R.B. 546, 550 (1952).
41. Under Board law established in 1945 in Midwest Piping & Supply Co., Inc., 63
N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945) and followed for three decades, Novak Logging Company, 119
N.L.R.B. 1573 (1958); Swift & Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 732 (1960); Sweater Bee by Banf,
Ltd., 197 N.L.R.B. 805 (1972); Inter-Island Resorts, Ltd., d/b/a Kona Surf Hotel, 201
N.L.R.B. 139 (1973), it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to recognize one of
two or more competing unions while a question of representation is pending before
the Board by virtue of the filing of a representation petition with the Board.
Newport Div. of Wintex Knitting Mill, Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 1293, 1295 (1976).
42. NLRB v. Air Master Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 181 (1963), enforcement denied, (339 F.2d
553 (3d Cir. 1964); Novak Logging Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1958); National Chem. & Mfg.
Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1190 (1951).
tions to an election that are still pending,4 3 or when a rival union's
claim is not clearly unsupportable or specious."
L Filing a Representation Petition Raises a Question of Repre-
sentation. -The Midwest Piping doctrine mandates a Board-con-
ducted election as the only method whereby an employer may
determine which union to recognize when a question concerning
representation arises.4 5 The problem is defining when a question of
representation exists. "In the broadest sense a question concerning
representation may be said to arise . . . whenever a union or indi-
vidual makes any sort of claim to represent a group of employees."46
The Board soon recognized, however, that the processing of casual
or possibly specious claims results in a waste of its resources and a
diversion from its basic objective of resolving serious labor dis-
putes.47 The Board therefore enacted certain administrative require-
ments that normally must be satisfied if the Board is to investigate
the necessity of conducting an election.48
Pursuant to Section 9(c) of the Act,4 9 the Board promulgated
regulations that require a petition requesting Board certification as
the exclusive bargaining representative be filed before an election
will be held. The petition must be timely, Z e. none of the bars to a
Board-conducted election can be present.50 The petition must also
43. Lake City Foundry, 173 N.L.R.B. 1081 (1968); Iowa Pork Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 1242
(1964).
44. Buck Knives, Inc., v. NLRB, 223 N.L.R.B. 983 (1976), enforcement denied, 549 F.2d
1319 (9th Cir. 1977); Playskool, Inc. v. NLRB, 195 N.L.R.B. 560 (1972), enforcement denied
477 F.2d 66 (7th Cir. 1973); American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 170 N.L.R.B. 85 (1968), enforce-
ment denied 411 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1969); Boys Mkt., Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 105 (1965).
45. Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1070 (1945).
46. NLRB v. Peter Paul, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 281, 287 (1970), enforcement denied 467 F.2d
700 (9th Cir. 1972).
47. Id
48. It was the "Board's administrative experience that in the absence of special factors
the conduct of an election serves no purpose under the statute unless the petitioner has been
designated by at least 30 percent of the employees." 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (1974). See 29 C.F.R.
§§ 101.17-.21 (1974) for Board procedures in representation cases.
When a petition is filed, an investigation is conducted to determine whether the adminis-
trative standards are met. If these standards are satisfied a question of representation exists.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1976). Section 9(c)(1) reads:
Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such regulations as
may be prescribed by the Board. . . .The Board shall investigate such petition and
if it has reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation affecting com-
merce exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice. . . .If the
Board finds upon the record of such hearing that such a question of representation
exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.
Id
50. There are several possible situations that could constitute a bar to the conducting of
an election. First, if there is a presently existing contract for the terms of employment and the
contract is for a term of one to three years, the contract is a bar to a petition for election. The
exception to this rule is when the petition is filed less than ninety days prior to the expiration of
the contract. General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962); Leonard Wholesale Meats, Inc.,
136 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1962).
Second, if the Board certifies a union or the majority representative, then the employer
must bargain with that union for a reasonable period, normally one year. Ray Brooks v.
concern an appropriate bargaining unit5 and be supported by an
adequate showing of interest. 2 Failure to satisfy any of these re-
quirements will cause the petition to be dismissed.53
These requirements are "purely administrative"54 and merely
cause the Board to conduct a hearing to determine if an election is
necessary." Nevertheless, the Board consistently finds Midwest Pip-
ing violations if an employer recognizes one of two or more compet-
ing unions when a petition is pending before the board.56 In that
situation, the Board will not permit the employer to resolve the rep-
resentation issue based on the employer's perception of employee
sentiment.57 Whenever a representation petition is pending, the pos-
sibility exists that the Board will decide that an election is necessary
to determine the bargaining representative. Employer recognition of
a union prior to a Board decision that an election is necessary could
lead to many complications. Consequently, prior to a final determi-
nation by the Board that an election is unnecessary, an employer will
not be permitted to recognize one of the unions. The Board adheres
to this position even when there is substantial evidence indicating
that the recognized union has the support of a majority of the em-
ployees.
2. Determination that a Representation Question Exists Absent a
Pending Election Petition. -Although the common means of raising
a representation question, filing a petition is not the exclusive man-
NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954), af'g, 98 N.L.R.B. 976 (1951). Third, Section 9(c) of the Act pro-
hibits the conducting of an election in any bargaining unit if a prior valid election was held
within twelve months. 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(2) (1976).
Last, if an employer voluntarily recognizes a union that has majority support and no rival
claims to representation exist at the time of recognition, then this lawful voluntary recognition
bars rival claims for a reasonable period. Keller Plastics Eastern, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583
(1966).
For a discussion of what constitutes a reasonable period, see Brennan's Cadillac, Inc., 231
N.L.R.B. 225 (1977).
51. 29 U.S.C. 159(b) (1976) provides:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the
fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit appro-
priate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit,
plant unit, or subdivision thereof. ...
52. The usual method of meeting the administrative requirement of an adequate showing
of interest is the presentation of authorization cards with signatures of thirty percent of the
employees. See 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (1974).
53. See U & I, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 1 (1976); Deluxe Metal Furniture, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B.
995 (1958).
54. The Sheffield Corp., 108 N.L.R.B. 349 (1954).
55. 1d at 350.
56. Newport Div. of Wintex Knitting Mill, Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 1292 (1976); Inter-Island
Resorts, Ltd., d/b/a Kona Surf Hotel, 201 N.L.R.B. 139 (1973), enforcement denied, 507 F.2d
411 (9th Cir. 1974).
57. Surburban Transit Corp. v. NLRB, 203 N.L.R.B. 465 (1973), enforcement denied, 499
F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Inter-Island Resorts, Ltd., d/b/a Kona Surf Hotel, 201
N.L.R.B. 139 (1973), enforcement denied, 507 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Peter Paul,
Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 281, 286 (1970), enforcement denied, 467 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1972); Scherrer
& Davisson Logging Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1587 (1958).
ner in which the Board is presented with the question. The Board
also finds a question of representation whenever there is an incum-
bent union, when objections to an election are pending, and when-
ever a rival union's claim is not clearly unsupportable or specious.
8
Therefore, under the Midwest Piting doctrine, an employer commits
an unfair labor practice if he recognizes a union before the Board
has officially resolved the representation issue.59
a. Effect of incumbency. -Despite the absence of a representa-
tion petition, the Board will find a question of representation if there
is an incumbent union.6" When a rival union attempts to organize a
company, the incumbent union need not support its request for an
election with the normally required showing of interest. This waiver
of the administrative requirement is based on the assumption that
"an incumbent union as such has a substantial claim to representa-
tion."6
For example, in NLRB v. Air Master Corp. 62 the Board found a
Midwest Piping violation when an employer recognized a rival union
that produced 230 verified authorization cards out of an employee
complement of 270. The only support for the Board's finding was
the incumbent status of the other union.6 3 This case reveals the
striking similarity between the Board's position when there is an in-
cumbent union and when a petition is filed. If the administrative
standards are satisfied there can be no employer recognition in the
rival union situation until an election determines which union has
the majority support.'
b. Effect ofpending objections to an election. -The administra-
tive standards of incumbency status or a filed petition deal with the
existence of a representation question before an election is held. The
58. See notes 42-44 and accompanying text supra.
59. American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 170 N.L.R.B. 85 (1968), enforcement denied, 411 F.2d
147 (6th Cir. 1969); Novak Logging Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1958).
60. NLRB v. Air Master Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 181 (1963), enforcement denied, 339 F.2d
553 (3d Cir. 1964); Novak Logging Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1958); National Chem. & Mfg.
Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1190 (1951).
61. NLRB v. Air Master Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 181, 188 (1963), enforcement denied, 339
F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1964).
62. Id
63. The local union was previously affiliated with the Seafarers International Union.
The leaders of the local union announced to management, however, that an overwhelming
majority of the employees had disaffiliated from the Seafarers International Union and now
desired to be affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. The local leaders also
produced 230 verified authorization cards signed for the Teamsters union.
64. If employers regularly recognized unions while Board proceedings were pending it
would do great damage to the reliability and efficiency of the certification process. Therefore,
it is important that the Board not permit employers to arrogate the resolution of representation
questions to themselves. The issue becomes whether it is necessary to await official Board
certification everytime the administrative standards for finding a representation question are
met.
Board will also find a continuation of a representation question after
an election is held if unresolved objections to the election are pend-
ing, even if one union is an overwhelming victor in the election.65
If the objections to the election have merit, the Board will con-
duct a rerun election. By arrogating to himself the resolution of the
representation question, the employer may make it difficult for the
Board to conduct a fair rerun election. Therefore, the Board protects
the integrity of its processes by requiring the employer to await the
final Board resolution of any objections to the election and, if neces-
sary, the holding of a rerun election before recognizing one of the
unions.
c. The "not clearly unsupportable or specious claim" stan-
dard-In American Bread Co.,6 6 the Board held that the rival
union's claim was sufficient to raise a question of representation even
though it lost an election only a year before and could produce only
eight authorization cards in a unit of ninety-two employees. 67 Con-
sequently, the employer violated his obligation of neutrality when he
recognized the other union upon a showing of authorization cards
signed by a majority of the employees in the unit and verified by an
independent third party. The Board reasoned that it is not necessary
for a union to make a substantial showing of support in order to
raise a question concerning representation, but rather a question
would arise whenever a rival union's claim to support among the
employees was not clearly unsupported or specious.68
Since American Bread, the Board has emphasized its refusal to
rely on numerical percentages to determine the existence of a repre-
sentation question.69 The Board has not, however, further clarified
what is the minimum standard for finding a question of representa-
tion. It merely reiterates the general "not clearly unsupportable or
65. See Taylor Forge Div., Gulf & W. Mfg. Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 696 (1977); Iowa Pork
Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 1242 (1964).
66. American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 170 N.L.R.B. 85 (1968), enforcement denied, 411 F.2d
147 (6th Cir. 1969).
67. On March 23, 1966, the local president of the Teamsters demanded recognition of his
organization as representative of the Company's sales drivers. He presented one authorization
card from the ninety-two employee unit but between March 31 and April II of that year seven
more employees signed cards for the Teamsters. The Teamsters local union president also
indicated that the Teamsters were then organizing another segment of the company's employ-
ees, and when a majority designated it as their bargaining representative he would notify the
company. Meanwhile the Bakery Workers Union presented the employer with 170 authoriza-
tion cards from the larger employee unit of 295 people. Id
68. Buck Knives, Inc. v. NLRB, 223 N.L.R.B. 983 (1976), enforcement denied, 549 F.2d
1319 (9th Cir. 1977); Playskool, Inc. v. NLRB, 195 N.L.R.B. 560 (1972), enforcement denied,
477 F.2d 66 (7th Cir. 1973); American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 170 N.L.R.B. 85 (1968), enforce-
ment denied, 411 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1969); Boy's Market, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 105 (1965).
69. Buck Knives, Inc. v. NLRB, 223 N.L.R.B. 983 (1976), enforcement denied, 549 F.2d
1319 (9th Cir. 1977); Surburban Transit Corp. v. NLRB, 203 N.L.R.B. 465 (1973), enforcement
denied, 499 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1974); Playskool, Inc. v. NLRB, 195 N.L.R.B. 560 (1972), enforce-
ment denied, 477 F.2d 66 (7th Cir. 1973).
specious claim" standard and then decides in each case whether or
not the standard is met.7" While the previously discussed standards
were coextensive with the Board's administrative standards for hold-
ing an election, this standard is not. Thus, the Board finds rival
union claims sufficient to raise a question of representation in cir-
cumstances when those unions would not have enough support to
invoke a Board-conducted election.
B. The Courts' View. A Real Question of Representation
The courts agree with the basic concept of Midwest Pping and
will enforce orders of the Board in the absence of a clear showing of
uncoerced majority support for the recognized union.7 But when
there is a clear showing of majority support that is not shown to be
coerced or backed by tainted72 authorization cards, the courts of ap-
peals uniformly refuse to find a representation question.73
The ultimate difference between the courts' view of the Midwest
Piping doctrine and the Board's view of the doctrine stems from
their differing views regarding the function of the doctrine. The
Board perceives the doctrine as ensuring the integrity of its election
machinery.74 The courts, however, perceive the doctrine as prevent-
ing an employer from imposing his choice on the employees.75 Fur-
thermore, while the Board believes that an election is the only
reliable indicator of employee choice in the rival union situation, the
courts believe that other reliable methods exist. The courts reject the
Board's position that the purposes and policies of the National La-
bor Relations Act can only be effectuated if an election is used in all
70. See note 69 supra.
71. Hartz Mountain Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 492 (1977), enforced sub nom.District 65, Dis-
tributive Workers v. NLRB, No. 77-1367 (D.C. Cir. September 26, 1978); American Can Co. v.
NLRB, 218 N.L.R.B. 102 (1975), enforced, 535 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Hudson
Berlind Corp., 203 N.L.R.B. 421 (1973), enforced, 494 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1974); St. Louis
Independent Packing Co. v. NLRB, 129 N.L.R.B. 622 (1960), enforced, 291 F.2d 700 (7th Cir.
1961).
72. Authorization cards are tainted if there is evidence of forgery, coercive circum-
stances, or a high proportion of dual signatures.
73. Buck Knives, Inc. v. NLRB, 223 N.L.R.B. 983 (1976), enforcement denied, 549 F.2d
1319 (9th Cir. 1977); Surburban Transit Corp. v. NLRB, 203 N.L.R.B. 465 (1973), enforcement
denied, 499 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1974); Playskool, Inc. v. NLRB, 195 N.L.R.B. 560 (1972), enforce-
mendenied, 477 F.2d 66 (7th Cir. 1973); Modine Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 186 N.L.R.B. 629 (1970),
enforcement denied, 453 F.2d (8th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Peter Paul, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 281
(1970), enforcement denied, 467 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1970); American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 170
N.L.R.B. 85 (1968), enforcement denied, 411 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Coming Glass
Works, 100 N.L.R.B. 444 (1952), enforcement denied, 204 F.2d 422 (1st Cir. 1953); Stuart-
Warner Corp. v. NLRB, 94 N.L.R.B. 607 (1951), enforcement denied, 194 F.2d 207 (4th Cir.
1952).
74. U & I, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 1 (1976) (concurring opinion); NLRB v. Inter-Island Re-
sorts, Ltd., 201 N.L.R.B. 139 (1973), enforcement denied, 507 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1974); Play-
skool, Inc. v. NLRB, 195 N.L.R.B. 560 (1972), enforcement denied, 477 F.2d 66 (7th Cir. 1973).
See generally Needfor Reappraisal, supra note 24.
75. See cases cited in note 74 supra.
rival union situations.76 Thus, in NLRB v. Air Master Corp.,77 the
court criticized the Board's insistence on an election because "[i]t is
interference with employees' choice, not frustration of the Board de-
sign to hold an election, which the statute proscribes as an unfair
labor practice."78
The divergent approaches taken by the courts and the Board in
analyzing issues of representation may be traced to their differing
perceptions of the function of the Midwest Piping doctrine. In Play-
skool, Inc. v. NLRB79 the court expressed this difference in philoso-
phy.
The Board looks first to the support held by the minority union
and finds a 'question concerning representation' if the claim of
that union is 'not clearly unsupportable,' the courts look first to
the support held by the majority union and find that no 'question
concerning representation' exists if that union has the validly ob-
tained support of an employee majority and the rival union is thus
shown to be 'no genuine contender. To
Under the judiciary's view of the doctrine, once a clear showing of
uncoerced majority support is made by a union, that union should be
recognized by the employer without undue delay. In the courts' view
this is "precisely the sort of cooperation that it is the policy of the Act
to foster."'"
C An Analysis
The purpose of the Midwest Pping doctrine is to prevent an em-
ployer from interfering with the expression of the employees' free
choice. 82 An overextension of the doctrine interferes with, rather
than protects, the prompt and uninhibited expression of employee
sentiment. 83 Both the courts and the Board agree that the doctrine
should be applied only when a question of representation exists."4
They also agree that the existence of a representation question de-
pends upon the factual circumstances of each case.85 They disagree,
76. Id
77. NLRB v. Air Master Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 181 (1963), enforcement denied, 339 F.2d
553 (3d Cir. 1964).
78. Id at ...._, 339 F.2d at 556.
79. 195 N.L.R.B. 560 (1972), enforcement denied, 477 F.2d 66 (7th Cir. 1973).
80. Id at - n.3, 477 F.2d at 77 n.3.
81. Surburban Transit Corp. v. NLRB, 203 N.L.R.B. 465 (1973), enforcement denied, 499
F.2d 78, 86 (3d Cir. 1974).
82. Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945); 10 NLRB ANN. REP. 39
(1945).
83. See Ensher, Alexander & Barsoom, Inc., 74 N.L.R.B. 1443 (1947).
84. See NLRB v. Western Commercial Transp., Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 17 (1973), enforced,
487 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1973); Intalco Aluminum Corp. v. NLRB, 169 N.L.R.B. 1034 (1968),
enforced in par.' and set aside in part, 417 F.2d 36 (9th Cir. 1969); William Penn Broadcasting
Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1104 (1951).
85. American Can Co. v. NLRB, 218 N.L.R.B. 102 (1975), enforced, 535 F.2d 180 (2d
Cir. 1976).
however, upon the standard that should be applied to determine
whether a representation question exists.
Whether the standard of the Board or the judiciary's standard
should be adopted depends upon the balancing of a number of fac-
tors. The following factors must be analyzed: (1) the effect of the
delay in recognition of the employees' collective bargaining repre-
sentative on industrial relations; (2) whether a Board-conducted
election is the only reliable method to determine employee choice;
and (3) the comparative ease and efficiency in the application of each
standard.
1. Does the Burden Justify the Beneft?-Because Midwest Pip-
ing requires an employer to await the final resolution of a represen-
tation question by the Board, long delays or gaps in the collective
bargaining process can occur." This frustrates the goal of stabilized
labor relations.87  The frustration of the employees' desire for
prompt recognition of their choice of a bargaining representative ag-
gravates the already unstabilized atmosphere present in a union elec-
tion campaign. 8 This problem is present whether or not an
incumbent union is involved, because a gap in employee representa-
tion is just as serious as a delay in effectuating the employees' choice
of an initial bargaining representative. In either case, the frustration
of employee choice results in discontent.
The Board's rationale for imposing the delay in recognition un-
til official certification is that a Board-conducted election will resolve
the representation question more clearly than any other method.89
Labor and management are then able to spend their time bargaining
over the terms and conditions of employment rather than engaging
in disputes over the majority status of the bargaining agent. More-
over, employee trust in the recognized union is increased because the
union has proven its majority status by the most reliable method
available, a Board-conducted election. Therefore, the Board be-
lieves the temporary instability caused by a delay in recognition is
86. The mean time from the filing of a petition to the issuance of a decision to hold an
election in 1977 was forty-three days. 42 NLRB ANN. REP. 15 (1977). A representation case is
held in abeyance if an unfair labor practice charge is filed. In 1977 the average time from the
filing of an unfair labor practice charge until issuance of a complaint was forty-eight days. 42
NLRB ANN. REP. 10 (1977). Therefore, without taking into consideration the time required to
run the election and issue a final decision, there can be a delay of greater than three months.
See Taylor Forge Div., Gulf& W. Mfg. Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 696 (1977); Stuart-Warner Corp. v.
NLRB, 94 N.L.R.B. 607 (1951), enforcement denied, 194 F.2d 207 (1952).
87. 227 N.L.R.B. 1 (1976) (concurring opinion); Stuart-Warner Corp. v. NLRB, 94
N.L.R.B. 607 (1951), enforcement denied, 194 F.2d 207 (1952).
88. NLRB v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 1750 (1953), enforcement de-
nied, 210 F.2d 501 (1954).
89. Buck Knives, Inc. v. NLRB, 223 N.L.R.B. 983 (1976), enforcement denied, 549 F.2d
1319 (9th Cir. 1977); Playskool, Inc. v. NLRB, 195 N.L.R.B. 560 (1972), enforcement denied,
477 F.2d 66 (7th Cir. 1973); Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945).
outweighed by the long-term benefit of greater employee trust in
their bargaining representative.9"
This rationale supports the Board's strict application of the Mid-
west Piping doctrine if there are no other reliable methods of deter-
mining employee choice of a bargaining representative. Because
there are other reliable methods, however, there is no justification for
imposing the doctrine and the delay inherent in its application.
2. Available Alternative Methods. -The use of authorization
cards or secret employee polls present two possible alternatives to a
Board-conducted election.
a. Authorization cards.-The Board often accepts authoriza-
tion cards as proof of majority sentiment in cases involving a single
union's attempt to organize the employees of a company.9' Thus,
the Board will issue a bargaining order 92 if it can be proved that an
employer had independent knowledge93 that the authorization cards
submitted to him reflected majority support for that union.94 If the
reliability of the authorization cards is confirmed, the employer is
faced with a demand for recognition by a union having majority
support. The Act requires the employer to bargain with the repre-
sentative that establishes its majority status.95
Previously, the Board accepted authorization cards as an indica-
90. Buck Knives, Inc. v. NLRB, 223 N.L.R.B. 983 (1976), enforcement denied, 549 F.2d
1314 (9th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Peter Paul, Inc, 185 N.L.R.B. 281 (1970), enforcement denied,
467 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1972); Novak Logging Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1958).
91. In Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), enforced Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v.
NLRB, 185 F.2d 32 (D.C. Cir. 1950), the Board held that an employer could not lawfully
refuse to recognize a union that had demonstrated majority status through authorization cards,
unless the employer could establish it had a good faith doubt of the union's majority status.
The burden of proof in dealing with the employer's subjective motives was shifted from the
employer to the Board in Aaron Bros. Co. of Cal., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966).
In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), the Supreme Court noted by way of
dicta that the Court had not abandoned its holding in UMW v. Arkansas Flooring Co., 351
U.S. 62 (1956), that a Board conducted election was not the only method by which an em-
ployer could satisfy itself whether a union had majority status.
92. The Board may order an employer to bargain with a union pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act. The Board is empowered "to take such affirmative action ... as will effectuate the
policies" of the Act to prevent unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). Section
8(a)(5) of the Act provides:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ...
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees. ...
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976).
93. This independent knowledge can be gained by a poll or by engaging a neutral party
to investigate whether the cards reflect employee sentiment. See Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B.
709 (1966).
94. If the employer does not have independent knowledge of the union's majority status,
the bargaining order will not issue in the absence of unfair labor practices. See Linden Lum-
ber Div., Sumner & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976) makes it an unfair labor practice to refuse to bargain
with a union designated by the majority of the employees as their bargaining representative.
tor of majority status in the rival union situation, 96 but they discon-
tinued the practice because they were "persuaded by. . .experience
that the policies of the Act [would] best be effectuated if the question
of representation which [arose was] resolved in an election by secret
ballot."97 The Board has failed to explain its position any further
except to cite the potential for coercion or dual signatures in the rival
union situation.9"
In many circumstances the Board's fears are justified.9 9 When
unfair labor practices or numerous dual signatures make the authori-
zation cards unreliable indicators of employee sentiment, the Board
should reject their use as an indicator of majority status. This does
not, however, relieve the Board of the responsibility of investigating
the reliability of authorization cards in all rival union situations.
A distinction must be made between the use of authorization
cards for an administrative showing of interest"° and their use as
evidence of majority support. When the cards are used for an ad-
ministrative showing, the purpose is merely to avoid unnecessary use
of the Board's election machinery.'' An investigation of the relia-
bility of the cards need not be exhaustive. When the cards are used
as evidence of majority support, however, the purpose is attaining
status as the exclusive bargaining representative. Therefore, the in-
vestigation must be thorough. The cards should be examined by a
neutral party to eliminate multiple signatures. A neutral party
should also conduct an inquiry to eliminate those authorization
cards obtained by coercion. When a union makes a clear showing of
majority support by authorization cards obtained under strict con-
trols, there is no reason for the employer to withhold recognition
from that union.'02 The courts recognize that once majority support
is established by one union it is inconsistent to find the existence of a
96. Cudahy Packing Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 526 (1939).
97. Id at 531-32.
98. Playskool, Inc. v. NLRB, 195 N.L.R.B. 560 (1972), enforcement denied 477 F.2d 66
(7th Cir. 1973); American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 170 N.L.R.B. 85 (1968), enforcement denied,
411 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1969).
99. See Iowa Beef Packers, Inc. v. NLRB, 144 N.L.R.B. 615 (1963), enforcement granted
in part and denied in part, 331 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 131
N.L.R.B. 1427 (1961), enforced, 303 F.2d 785 (1962).
100. An administrative showing of interest is the percentage of employee signatures re-
quired to support a union's petition for a Board conducted election. See 29 C.F.R. § 101.18
(1974).
101. NLRB v. Peter Paul, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 281 (1970), enforcement denied 467 F.2d 700
(9th Cir. 1972).
102. One court has noted:
[When a clear majority of the employees without subjection to coercion or other
unlawful influence, have made manifest their desire to be represented by a particular
union, there is no factual basis for a contention that the employer's action thereafter
in recognizing the union or contracting with it is interference with their freedom of
choice.
NLRB v. Air Master Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 181 (1963), enforcement denied 339 F.2d 553, 557
(3d Cir. 1964).
question of representation. 103 The Board should not, therefore, con-
tinue to find representation questions if one union has made a clear,
uncoerced showing of majority support.
b. Secretpolls. -A secret employee poll is another possible al-
ternative to a Board-conducted election. In Strusknes Construction
Co., 1' the Board held that a poll taken while a representation peti-
tion was pending before the Board would violate Section 8(a)(1)° 5of
the Act.'1 6 The Board reasoned that a poll would not serve any legit-
imate interest of the employer that would not be better served by a
Board-conducted election.0 7 This view, however, fails to perceive
that the delay caused by waiting for an election may be unnecessary
if employee sentiment can be quickly and reliably determined by a
secret poll.
The method used to determine the employees' choice of a bar-
gaining representative is not significant. That the employees' choice
be effectuated in the quickest manner possible is important, however.
Both secret polls and authorization cards are reliable substitutes for
a Board-conducted election in all but the most extreme situations. 08
Thus, the Board should follow the courts' lead in holding that an
employer's recognition of a union, without awaiting an election, is
an unfair labor practice only when the union does not have a clear
showing of majority support.
3. Possibility of Confusion from Abandonment of the Board
103. See NLRB v. Inter-Island Resorts, Ltd., 201 N.L.R.B. 139 (1973), enforcement de-
nied 507 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Peter Paul, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 281 (1970), enforce-
ment denied, 467 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Air Master Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 181
(1963), enforcement denied, 339 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1964).
104. Strusknes Construction Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967).
105. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). Section 8(a)(l) reads:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 157 of this title.
106. The Board held that polls of employees by the employer would violate the Act unless:
(1) the purpose of the poll was to determine the truth of the union's claim to majority status;
(2) this purpose is communicated to the employees; (3) assurances against reprisals are given;
(4) employees are polled by secret ballot; and (5) the employer has not engaged in unfair labor
practices or otherwise created a coercive atmosphere. Strusknes Construction Co., 165
N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967). Although this case dealt with a single union's attempt to gain majority
status, the controls imposed by the Board could make such a poll equally reliable in the rival
union situation.
107. It would be ideal if employers could always await a Board conducted election. Nev-
ertheless, in order to establish an atmosphere of cooperation it is important that an employer
promptly recognize a union after it makes a clear showing of majority support. Therefore,
protection of the Board's administrative procedures should never take precedence over the
effectuation of employee sentiment. See NLRB v. Inter-Island Resorts, Ltd., d/b/a Kona Surf
Hotel, 201 N.L.R.B. 139 (1973).
108. It would be best to await an election when unfair labor practices of other actions of
the parties involved promote a coercive atmosphere. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc. v. NLRB, 144
N.L.R.B. 615 (1963), enforcement granted in part and denied in part, 331 F.2d 176 (8th Cir.
1964).
Standard-A Board-conducted election is not the only reliable
method of determining whether a rival union represents a majority
of the employees. Therefore, the only possible rationale for continu-
ing to adhere to the strict construction of the doctrine followed by
the Board is the possibility of confusion if the Board's standard is
abolished.
The simplicity of the Board's position and its strict application
eliminate confusion. Once a rival union's claim meets certain ad-
ministrative requirements or proves that its claim is not clearly un-
supportable, a representation question exists.' 09 When the Board's
standards are satisfied the employer has no choice but to await offi-
cial Board certification."' The advantage of this strict standard is
the elimination of disputes, concerning whether sufficient evidence
exists for the employer to recognize one of the unions.
While elimination of disputes is important, such strict construc-
tion of the Midwest lPing doctrine creates problems. The Board's
standard achieves simplicity at the expense of realism. A representa-
tion question cannot exist if there is no doubt about which union
possesses majority support. Therefore, when a union proves its ma-
jority support by utilizing an alternative method, the inquiry should
not focus upon whether a rival claim exists that is not clearly spe-
cious, but rather upon the reliability of the evidence of support.
Although the courts' use of alternate methods in determining
whether a question of representation exists may invite conflicting in-
terpretations initially, the possibility of confusion is no greater than
with the Board's standard. Both standards look to the factual cir-
cumstances of each case. They only differ in application because the
courts favor flexibility and a cooperative atmosphere while the
Board leans toward rigidity and an atmosphere of mistrust. The goal
of encouraging cooperative labor-management relations is best ad-
vanced by the standard applied by the judiciary. Therefore, the
Board should adopt the courts' position that a question of represen-
tation will be found only when no union can make a clear showing
of majority support.
III. Conclusion
The National Labor Relations Act reflects the national labor
policy objectives of industrial stability and employee freedom of
choice. Recognition of a union as an exclusive bargaining represen-
tative before its majority status has been reliably established inter-
feres with the exercise of the employees' freedom of choice. The
109. See notes 41-44 supra.
110. Surburban Transit Corp. v. NLRB, 203 N.L.R.B. 465 (1973), enforcement denied 499
F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1974).
Midwest Piping doctrine, by prohibiting recognition of one of the
rival unions before official Board certification resolves the issue, pro-
tects the employee from this coercive influence. Although the doc-
trine is a valuable asset to the protection of employee freedom of
choice, if it is applied indiscriminately it will hinder rather than pro-
mote the goals of employee self-organization and industrial peace.
The Board's assumption that its own elections are the only relia-
ble method of establishing majority status is erroneous. Authoriza-
tion cards and secref employee polls are just two of the many reliable
alternative methods that can substitute for a Board-conducted elec-
tion. The courts are correct, therefore, in holding that no question of
representation exists when a clear showing of majority support is
made by the union recognized. The Board's standard, however, ag-
gravates the already unstable atmosphere in union election cam-
paigns by imposing delays when the employees' choice of a
bargaining representative is clear. The Board's practice of finding a
question of representation whenever a rival union's claim is not
clearly unsupportable or specious is counterproductive to the
achievement of a cooperative attitude between labor and manage-
ment. Therefore, to promote labor-management cooperation, the
Board should abstain from applying the Midwest Piping doctrine
when an employer recognizes one of the rival unions after a clear
showing of uncoerced majority support.
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